Conditional Humanitarianism: Citizen Preferences for Economic Sanctions in Democratic Sender States

Abstract: Economic sanctions are a critical tool of international diplomacy. Existing scholarship shows that citizens in democratic sender states value sanctions which are effective in producing policy concessions. However, citizens also seek to limit the adverse humanitarian consequences of sanction imposition. How do citizens trade off between these objectives? We develop a theory of sanctions preferences where citizens (i) value policy concessions, (ii) hold humanitarian motivations, and (iii) hold beliefs about how policy change occurs in autocracies. We argue that citizens are conditional humanitarians – humanitarian concerns dominate effectiveness considerations only if policy concessions are unlikely. Results from a preregistered willingness-to-pay experiment examining the preferences of German citizens on sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine confirm the predictions of our theory.

Recommended citation: Moritz Bondeli, Isabela Mares and Ryan Pike. (2024). Conditional Humanitarianism: Citizen Preferences for Economic Sanctions in Democratic Sender States. Working Paper.